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Abstract 
We apply a robust bootstrap to evaluate the performance of a large universe of hedge 
funds. Our bootstrap estimates indicate that the performance of the top hedge funds cannot be 
attributed to chance alone. This is true even after adjusting for back fill bias, serial correlation, 
and structural breaks. Also, we find that hedge fund alpha differences persist over three year 
horizons. However, an investment strategy designed around this will run into difficulties as 
the persistence is often confined to small funds that are effectively closed to new inflows. 
Moreover, Bayesian estimates suggest that standard alphas may be overestimated by 41% for 
the average top fund. 
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1 Introduction
Were stellar hedge funds like George SorosQuantum Fund just lucky and their existence to be
expected with such a large sample of 5000 hedge funds in 2003? If not, does their abnormal
performance persist and can it be exploited by means of trading strategies? What drives top
performance? These questions are increasingly on the minds of institutional and retail investors
who have recently raised their portfolio allocations to hedge funds.1 The aim of this paper is to
answer these questions by examining a comprehensive hedge fund database using a robust bootstrap
method and a Bayesian framework.
The hedge fund industry has changed considerably over the last decade. The HFR 2003 report
indicates that there were 530 hedge funds managing under US$39 billion in 1990, while there are
over 5000 hedge funds managing over US$817 billion by end of 2003. The strategy mix of the hedge
fund industry has also shifted notably. In 1990, the industry was dominated by funds following the
Global Macro strategy. By the end of 2003, the largest number of funds belonged to equity based
strategies like Equity Hedge, Hedge Long-Bias, Event Driven, etc.
Our understanding of the risk-return trade-o¤s for di¤erent hedge fund strategies has improved
signicantly in recent years, thanks to the pioneering work of Fung and Hsieh (1999, 2001, 2002),
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and more recently, Agarwal and Naik (2004).2 Specically, we know
now that hedge fund returns relate to conventional asset class returns in a linear as well as an
option-like way. They also relate to the returns of the small cap minus large cap spread and the
1About-one third of institutional investors including CalPERS in America plan to increase their allocation to such
funds. (For the fortunate few,The Economist, print edition, 3rd July 2003.)
In Europe several countries including Luxembourg, Germany and Ireland have revised the rules and regulations
governing the creation and distribution of hedge funds and followed the trend set in Asia by permitting the distribution
of hedge funds to retail investors. (Hedge Funds entering the Mass-MarketArena by Michael Ferguson, Ernst
and Young, Luxembourg, February 2004.)
2Fung and Hsieh (1999, 2001) show that Global/Macrofunds deliver collarlike payo¤s while Trend Followers
exhibit a look-back straddle like payo¤. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and Agarwal and Naik (2004) demonstrate
that a number of equity-based hedge fund strategy payo¤s resemble that obtained from writing an uncovered put
option on the equity market.
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credit spread. More importantly, a signicant part of the variation in hedge fund returns over time
can be explained by systematic risk factors. These insights enable us to segregate hedge fund returns
into two components: one that can be explained by exposure to systematic risks (the market risk
component), and other that cannot be explained by systematic risk factors (the manager specic
component). The former represents the reward for bearing market risk, while the latter represents
the reward attributable to manager skill.
Estimating the manager specic component, or alpha, has received considerable attention in the
recent years, both in the popular press and in the nancial economics literature.3 In this paper, we
use the insights from the pioneering work listed earlier, and estimate the non-systematic component
of return on hedge funds. Specically, we focus on two particular issues. Is the non-systematic
component of return purely due to luck? If not, does it show persistence and is it possible to
construct a trading rule that can capture it?
To answer these questions, one requires a methodology that fullls at least three requirements.
First, it must account for the fact that star funds are drawn from a large cross-section of hedge funds
which increases the potential for some managers to do particularly well. Second, it should allow for
the fact that hedge fund performance measures do not follow parametric normal distributions given
the fundsdynamic trading strategies and holdings of options and derivatives securities. Third, it
should be robust to possible misspecication of the factor model given that the complexity of hedge
fund returns make their benchmarking more challenging than for mutual funds.
The bootstrap methodology presented by Kosowski et al (2004) satises these conditions. There-
fore we follow their methodology and provide a comprehensive examination of hedge fund perfor-
mance that explicitly controls for luck, while minimizing potential bias from mis-specication. In
bootstrapping performance estimates, we explicitly model and control for the expected idiosyn-
cratic variation in hedge fund returns. Specically, we model the cross-sectional distribution of
alpha estimates (across all funds) with the bootstrap, and then examine the signicance of alpha
3See, for example, Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Jensen (1968), Treynor and Black (1972), Merton (1981), Henriksson
and Merton (1981), Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982), Dybvig and Ross (1985), Admati et al (1986), Jagannathan and
Korajczyk (1986), Connor and Korajczyk (1986), Lehmann and Modest (1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and
Glosten and Jagannathan (1994).
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outliers. The rationale for the bootstrap methodology is threefold. First, evidence of non-normality
in hedge fund returns and alpha estimates documented below proves that traditional parametric
normal assumptions are inappropriate for more than 70% of hedge funds. Non-normal benchmark
or individual security returns, co-skewed benchmark and security returns, holdings of options and
derivatives with non-linear payo¤s, dynamic factor loading strategies by managers, and time-series
and cross-sectional correlations in the idiosyncratic return component of funds may all result in non-
normal distributions of estimated alphas. Second, while the central limit theorem justies regarding
the normal distribution as a rst-order approximation to the true distribution, the bootstrap can
substantially improve on this approximation (see, for example, Bickel and Freedman (1984) and
Hall (1986)). As emphasized by Horowitz (2003), the bootstrap has been shown in Monte Carlo
experiments to spectacularly reduce di¤erences between the true and nominal probabilities of cor-
rectly rejecting a given null hypothesis (in our case, that no superior hedge fund managers exist).
Furthermore, given the di¢ culties in parametrically modelling the joint distribution of hedge fund
performance across thousands of funds, most of which are very sparsely overlapping, the bootstrap
o¤ers a very attractive alternative approach.
Although we present several bootstrap results for the distribution of fund alphas, our tests also
rely on bootstrapping the distribution of the t-statistic of the alphas, which has superior bootstrap
properties, especially in the extreme tails of the performance distribution. Moreover, we present
results for several extensions of the bootstrap methodology. In particular, we show that our results
are not sensitive to the presence of an omitted factor or possible cross-sectional correlations in
idiosyncratic returns among hedge funds. In addition, we carry out extensive robustness tests
that take into account issues peculiar to hedge fund data like backll bias (Ackermann, McEnally,
and Ravenscraft (1999) and Posthuma and Van de Sluis (2003)) and short term serial correlation
in returns (Getsmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004)). Across all classes of measures, our bootstrap
tests indicate that, controlling for sampling variability (luck), superior hedge funds that beat their
benchmarks (net of expenses) by an economically and statistically signicant amount do exist. We
nd this result both with our alpha bootstrap and our t-statistic of alpha bootstrap, as well as with
the bootstrap extensions that we employ.
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As a complement to the bootstrap approach, we also adopt a Bayesian framework to examine
hedge fund performance. Our motivation is threefold. First, it has been shown that information
from seemingly unrelated assets (henceforth SUR) can improve estimates of performance measures.
See, for example, Stambaugh (1997) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) (henceforth PS). Second,
hedge fund returns have shorter time series than mutual fund returns thus making the application
of the Bayesian SUR approach even more relevant. Third, the SUR method provides additional
robustness against the misspecication of the regression model that is being adopted, which is a
concern, given that hedge fund strategies are more complex than those of mutual funds. Consistent
with PSs results for mutual funds, we nd that standard OLS measures of performance for hedge
funds overestimate performance by 41% compared to the more accurate Bayesian estimates.
To test whether investors can take advantage of the abnormal performance of the top fund, we
implement a simple routine to determine whether high-alpha funds persist. The results show that
funds with high alphas tend to have high alphas in the future. This is true over evaluation and
formation horizons of three years. This persistence not due to the imputation of fees. However, it
is di¢ cult for an investor to take advantage of this persistence as it is mostly driven by small funds
who experience little inows, suggesting that they are e¤ectively closed to new investments. Our
results are, in general, consistent with Berk and Green (2002), where any persistence is competed
away by fund inows (since managers may have decreasing returns to scale in their talents).
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the hedge fund data used in our study,
while Section 3 presents the performance measures used in our bootstrapping procedure. Section
4 provides the empirical results based on the bootstrap and Bayesian SUR approaches. It includes
bootstrap results broken down by investment category and the robustness checks on the bootstrap
procedure. Section 5 presents a case study on the top hedge funds and persistence tests on fund
alphas. We conclude the paper in Section 6.
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2 Data
We evaluate the performance of hedge funds using monthly net-of-fee returns of live and dead hedge
funds reported in the TASS, HFR, CISDM, and MSCI datasets over January 1990 to December
2002 period - a time period that covers both market upturns and downturns, as well as relatively
calm and turbulent periods. In our fund universe, we have a total of 6,392 live hedge funds and
2,946 dead hedge funds. However, due to concerns that funds with assets under management below
20 million USD may be too small for many institutional investors, we exclude such funds from the
analysis. This leaves us with a total of 4,300 live hedge funds and 1,233 dead hedge funds. The
breakdown of funds by database is illustrated in Figure 1. The Venn diagram in Figure 1 reveals
that the funds are roughly evenly split among TASS, HFR, and CISDM/MSCI.4 While there are
overlaps among the databases, there are many funds that belong to only one specic database.
For example, there are 1,410 funds and 1,513 funds peculiar to the TASS and HFR databases
respectively. This highlights the advantage of obtaining our funds from a variety of data vendors.
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
Although the term hedge fundoriginated from the equity long and short strategy employed
by managers like Alfred Winslow Jones, the new denition of hedge funds covers a multitude of
di¤erent strategies. Unlike the traditional investment arena, there does not exist a universally
accepted norm to classify hedge funds into di¤erent strategy classes. We follow Agarwal, Daniel,
and Naik (2004) and segregate them into ve broad investment categories: Directional Traders,
Relative Value, Security Selection, Multi-process, and Fund of Funds. Directional Trader funds
usually bet on the direction of market prices of currencies, commodities, equities, and bonds in the
futures and cash market. Relative Value funds take positions on spread relations between prices
of nancial assets and aim to minimize market exposure. Security Selection funds take long and
short positions in undervalued and overvalued securities respectively and reduce systematic risks
in the process. Usually they take positions in equity markets. Multi-process funds employ multiple
strategies usually involving investments in opportunities created by signicant transactional events,
4The CISDM and MSCI databases are combined in Figure 1 to facilitate illustration. A further breakdown of
funds into each of the four databases is available upon request.
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such as spin-o¤s, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy reorganizations, recapitalizations, and share
buybacks. Fund of Funds invest in a pool of hedge funds and typically have lower minimum invest-
ment requirements. We also single out Equity Long/Short funds as their strategies are particularly
easy to understand and their risks are easy to capture. Note that Equity Long/Short funds are
a subset of Security Selection funds. As a prelude to the bootstrap analysis, we perform tests of
normality, heteroskedasticity, and serial correlation to examine the behavior of fund returns in our
sample broken down by investment category.
<Insert Table I about here>
The Jarque Bera test results reported in Table I, suggest that the majority of funds have
returns that are not normally distributed. Over all classes of funds, about 70% of the funds
fail the normality test, attesting to the need for non-parametric methods like the bootstrap when
evaluating fund performance. Table I also reveals that fund returns are often serially correlated and
fund residuals often heteroscedastic. Directional Traders fund returns appear to be most serially
correlated while Multi-process fund residuals are most prone to heteroscedasticity.
3 Generalized asset class factor model
3.1 Factor benchmarks and performance measure 
In order to examine the value added by hedge funds, we regress the net-of-fee monthly excess
return (in excess of the risk free rate) of a hedge fund on the excess returns earned by passive
option-based, traditional buy-and-hold, and primitive trend following strategies. That is, we use
as performance benchmarks the combined factors from the Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and
Hsieh (2001) models. The Agarwal and Naik (2004) factors are Russell 3000 index (RUS3000), Fama
and French size (SMB), book-to-market (HML) and momentum (MOM) factors, MSCI excluding
US index (MXUS), MSCI emerging markets index (MEM), Salomon bond index (SBG), Salomon
world government index (SBW), Lehman high yield bond index (LHY), Fed trade weighted dollar
index (FRBI), Goldman Sachs commodity index (GSCI), Moodys BAA rated corporate bond
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index (BAA), OTM call option index (SPCX), and OTM put option index (SPPX).5 The Fung
and Hsieh (2001) factors are S&P 500 return (SP), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return
(SML), change in the constant maturity yield of the 10 year treasury (TSY), change in the spread
of Moodys Baa minus 10 year treasury (HYMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), commodities PTFS
(PTFSCOM), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), short term interest rate straddle PTFS (PTFSSIR), and
stock PTFS (PTFSSTK), where PTFS denotes primitive trend following strategy. This represents
the most comprehensive collection of hedge fund factors used in a study to date and minimizes the
possibility of an omitted factor. Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2001) both show
that their respective factor model strongly explains variation in individual hedge fund returns.
To conserve degrees of freedom and to mitigate potential multi-collinearity problems, we use a
stepwise regression approach where the independent variables are entered into the discriminant
function one at a time, based on their discriminating power. The single best variable is chosen
rst; the initial variable is then paired with each of the other independent variables, one at a time,
and a second variable with maximum incremental discriminating power is chosen, and so on. We
use this procedure to ascertain the factors that, ex post, explain the returns earned by hedge funds
during our sample period. We take the statistical signicance of the factors, which are computed
via Newey-West (1987) standard errors, as the measure of discriminating power.6
Since we use excess returns on selected options on index portfolios as additional factor excess
returns, the intercept (bi) from the regression below represents the value added by the manager of
hedge fund i after controlling for her linear and non-linear risk exposures. In particular, to evaluate
the performance of hedge funds we run the following regression7
5To avoid multi-collinearity problems, we omit the Agarwal and Naik (2004) ATM call option index and ATM
put option index factors from our analysis.
6Our base bootstrap results remain unchanged when we use the full set of Agarwal and Naik (2004) factors or
when we use the full set of Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors in place of the stepwise regression approach.
7See Glosten and Jagnnathans (1994) section 2 for the theoretical underpinnings of equation (1). In our regression
the value added or the alpha is given by the intercept while in their regression (see their section 4) it is given by
the sum of the intercept, the coe¢ cient on the index and the value of the call option.
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rit = bi + KX
k=1
bikFk;t +bit (1)
where,
rit = net-of-fees excess return (in excess of the risk free rate of interest) on an individual hedge
fund i for month t,
bi = alpha performance measure - value added by a hedge fund i over the regression time
period,bik = average factor loading of an individual hedge fund i on kth factor during the regression
period,
Fk;t = excess return (in excess of the risk free rate of interest) on kth factor for month t,
(k = 1; :::::::;K) where the factor could be a Trading Strategy factor (an option-based strategy) or
a Location factor (a long position in an index), and a Trend Following factor
bit = error term.
In the next section we apply the non-parametric bootstrap to test whether the returns of hedge
funds can be explained by luck alone. We evaluate the performance (alpha and its t-statistic) of the
hedge funds relative to the Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors and then
bootstrap the residuals. We rst do so on the entire sample of hedge funds. Subsequent tests are
done on subperiods to gauge the e¤ects of a structural break, and on subsamples of funds broken
down by style category to ascertain the robustness of the basic results. The advantage of using the
Agarwal and Naik (2004) model is that it includes option-based risk factors (SPCX and SPPX).
These factors capture the left tail risk in hedge funds which are ignored by the commonly used
mean-variance framework.
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3.2 The bootstrap approach
The bootstrap is a nonparametric approach to statistical inference.8 There are several advantages
in using the bootstrap to evaluate hedge fund performance. First, traditional parametric methods
use a priori assumptions about the shape of the distribution from which individual fund alphas
are drawn. As Table I shows the empirical distribution of residuals from multi-factor performance
regressions is highly non-normal for the hedge funds in our data. 70 percent of our hedge funds
exhibit non-normalities compared to about 48 percent of the mutual funds in the Kosowski et
al (2004) study. Thus, the distribution of b may be poorly approximated by normality and its
statistical signicance should be evaluated by means of a non-parametric approach such as the
bootstrap.
Second, although the central limit theorem justies regarding the normal distribution as a
rst-order approximation to the true distribution, the bootstrap can substantially improve on this
approximation (see, for example, Bickel and Freedman (1984) and Hall (1986)). As emphasized
by Horowitz (2003), the bootstrap has been shown in Monte Carlo experiments to spectacularly
reduce di¤erences between the true and nominal probabilities of correctly rejecting a given null
hypothesis (in our case, that no superior fund managers exist).
Third, the use of the bootstrap approach to assess the performance of the best and worst fund
managers is motivated by dependence of the distribution of fundsperformance estimates on the
entire covariance matrix characterizing the joint distribution of individual funds. Even for funds
with residuals that are adequately approximated by a normal distribution, it is infeasible to apply
standard statistical methods to assess the signicance of extreme alphas drawn from a large universe
of funds. In this case, the best alpha is the maximum value drawn from a multivariate distribution
whose dimension depends on the number of funds in existence. The distribution of this maximum
alpha depends on the entire covariance matrix for the joint distribution of the individual fund
alphas or, more generally, its copula - which is generally impossible to estimate with precision. For
example, besides the very large dimension of this matrix with several hundred or even thousands
8Our approach is based on the bootstrap introduced by Efron (1979). For a detailed discussion of the properties
of the bootstrap, see, for example, Efron and Tibshirani (1993) or Hall (1992).
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of funds, the entry and exit of funds imply that many funds do not even have overlapping return
records with which to estimate covariances.
In addition, renements of the bootstrap (which we will implement) provide a general approach
for dealing with unknown time-series dependencies that are due, for example, to heteroskedasticity
or serial correlation in the residuals from performance regressions. These bootstrap renements
also address the estimation of cross-sectional correlations in regression residuals, thus avoiding the
estimation of a very large covariance matrix for these residuals. See Kosowski et al (2004) and the
Appendix for further details on the bootstrap approach.
The hypothesis that the manager of the very best fund among L funds cannot produce a positive
alpha is:
H0 : max
i=1;:::;L
i  0 , and
HA : max
i=1;:::;L
i > 0:
We also examine whether the funds in the left and right tail generate statistically signicant alphas.
To illustrate, suppose that a group of hedge funds have been ranked by their alphas, and let i be
the rank of a given fund. When testing whether managers of the best ranked funds cannot generate
positive alphas, the null and alternative hypotheses are
H0 : i  0 , and
HA : i > 0:
We also test whether managers of the worst-ranked funds cannot generate negative alphas. Here,
the hypothesis test takes the following form for a fund with rank i:
H0 : i  0 , and
HA : i < 0:
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Kosowski et al (2004) propose the estimated t-statistic of b, btb, as a second measure of per-
formance and justify its use based on its superior statistical properties. Although b measures the
economic size of abnormal performance, it has a relatively high coverage error in construction of
condence intervals.9 Also, btb has another attractive statistical property. Specically, funds with
a shorter history of monthly net returns will have an alpha estimated with less precision, and will
tend to generate alphas that are outliers. The t-statistic provides a correction for these spurious
outliers by normalizing the estimated alpha by the estimated precision of the alpha estimateit is
related to the well-known information ratiomethod of performance measurement of Treynor and
Black (1973). For these reasons, the our bootstrap tests will typically also include testing btb.10
Using this performance measure, the null and alternative hypotheses for the highest ranked
fund are
H0 : max
i=1;:::;L
ti  0, and
HA : max
i=1;:::;L
ti > 0:
For the lowest-ranked fund, the null and alternative hypotheses are given by reversing the
inequalities above.
3.3 Bootstrap implementation: The baseline bootstrap procedure (residual-
only resampling)
In this section, we illustrate our bootstrapping procedure for generating fund alphas with the multi-
factor model in equation (1). The basic intuition for the bootstrap is the comparison of the actually
observed top fund performance to the performance of top funds in articially generated samples
of data where fundsperformance is controlled to be the result of sampling variability or luck. To
9The coverage probability is the probability that the condence interval includes the true parameter, and the
coverage error is the di¤erence between the true and nominal coverage. Alternatively, btb is a pivotal statistic, and,
thus, generates lower coverage errors. A pivotal statistic is one that is not a function of nuisance parameters, such as
V ar("it). For further details, see the Kosowski et al (2004).
10We estimate btb using a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted estimate of the standard error.
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prepare for our bootstrap procedure, we use the multi-factor model in equation (1) to compute the
OLS-estimated alphas, factor loadings, and residuals using the time-series of monthly net returns
for fund i in the following equation:
rit = bi + KX
k=1
bikFk;t +bit (2)
where rit; bi; bik and Fk;t are dened as above. For fund i, the coe¢ cient estimates, fbi, big, are
saved, as well as the time-series of estimated residuals, fbit , t = 1; Tig. In addition, the t-statistic
of alpha, btb, is computed.
In a portfolio context, residual-only resampling is used to help control for non-normal security
returns, which can induce non-normal portfolio returns.11 In addition, co-skewness of individual
securities and the market as well as dynamic factor loading strategies by hedge funds may result
in non-normal distributions of estimated alphas.
For residual (only) resampling, we draw a sample with replacement from the fund i residuals
that are saved in the rst step, creating a time-series of resampled residuals, fbbi;t , t = sb1; sb2; :::; sbTig,
where b=1 (for bootstrap resample number one), and, as indicated, where a sample is drawn having
the same number of residuals (e.g., the same number of time periods, Ti) as the original sample
for each fund i. This resampling procedure is repeated for the remaining bootstrap iterations, b =
2; :::; B:
Next, for each bootstrap iteration, b, a time-series of (bootstrapped) monthly net returns is
constructed for this fund, imposing the null hypothesis of zero true performance (i = 0, or,
equivalently, btb = 0):
frbi;t =
KX
k=1
bikFk;t +bbi;t , t = sb1; sb2; :::; sbTig; (3)
where sb1; s
b
2; :::; s
b
Ti
is the time reordering imposed by resampling the residuals in bootstrap iteration
b. As indicated by Equation (3), this sequence of articial returns has a true alpha (and t-statistic
11Co-skewness of individual security returns may not diversify away in large portfolios, especially if an omitted
factor is responsible. In Table I, we provide evidence that the majority of funds have non-normal distributions of
returns.
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of alpha) of zero, since the residuals are drawn from a sample that is mean zero by construction.
However, when we next regress the returns for a given bootstrap sample, b, on the multi-factor
model, a positive estimated alpha (and t-statistic) may result, since that bootstrap may have drawn
an abnormally high number of positive residuals, or, conversely, a negative alpha (and t-statistic)
may result if an abnormally high number of negative residuals are drawn.
Repeating these steps across funds, i = 1; :::; N , and bootstrap iterations, b = 1; :::; B, we then
build the cross-sectional distribution of the alpha estimates, bbi , or their t-statistics, btbbi , resulting
purely from sampling variation, as we impose the null of no abnormal performance. Bootstrapping
the distribution of the maximum btb proceeds similarly. If we nd that very few of the bootstrap
iterations generate as large values of b or btb; as those observed in the actual data, this suggests that
sampling variation (luck) is not the source of performance, but that genuine stock picking/asset
selection skills may exist. In all of our bootstrap tests, we set B = 1; 000.
Our baseline bootstrap approachresidual-only resamplingresamples only the residuals saved
abovethis procedure is described in the next section. An extension to this approachresidual
and factor resamplingindependently resamples both the factor returns and the residuals, and is
described in detail in Appendix A.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Basic bootstrap results
Table II Panel A displays the results from our application of the bootstrap algorithm to assess the
statistical signicance of hedge funds.12 The funds are ranked in two di¤erent ways.. The rst two
rows of Panel A rank funds according to their estimated alphas. The third and fourth rows rank
funds based on the estimated alpha t-statistics. The rationale for the ranking by t statistics is
based on its superior statistical properties (discussed in Section 3.2 above) and its interpretation as
12As we require su¢ cient return data to estimate the factor loadings, only funds with at least 30 months of return
data are included in the bootstrap sample. As a robustness check, we also perform the bootstrap on funds with at
least 48 months of return data and nd qualitatively similar results. These results are available from the authors
upon request.
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a measure that penalizes alpha for its inherent noise (or standard error). The results are displayed
for the extreme top 5 and bottom 5 funds as well as funds at the 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 10th percentiles
on both ends of the alpha and alpha t-statistic spectrums.
<Insert Table II about here>
The results displayed in Table II Panel A suggest that whether we rank funds by abnormal
performance (alpha) or alpha t-statistic, the abnormal returns of funds in the extreme deciles
cannot be explained by luck alone. The top alpha fund registers a spectacular abnormal return
of 7.35% per month while the top alpha t-statistic fund registers an impressive t-statistic of 42.23.
The bootstrap p-values suggest that such abnormal returns are unlikely (probability < 0.01) the
result of random chance. The same may be said of the other top ve funds and the other funds in
the top 90th percentile. While these funds have alphas and alpha t-statistics that are nowhere as
impressive as the top fund, none of their alphas or alpha t-statistics can be explained by luck alone.
A similar situation prevails with the funds in the left tail of the return distribution. However, here
the bootstrapped p-values reveal that the fund alphas and alpha t-statistics are more noisy than
those of the funds in the right tail. For the left tail funds displayed in Panel A, the hypothesis that
the alphas of these funds are due to random chance cannot be rejected for two of the ten displayed
funds at the 5% level of signicance. Also, the hypothesis that the alpha t-statistics of these funds
are the result of random chance cannot be rejected for two of the ten displayed funds at the 5%
level of signicance.
To further illustrate the baseline results of the bootstrap, we plot the kernel density estimate
of the bootstrapped and actual alpha distributions for all funds in Figure 2. The two densities
are rather di¤erent. The distribution of the alphas have much more mass on the tails than the
bootstrapped alpha distribution. This is especially true of the right tail and suggests that we are
likely to nd funds in the right tail with superior alphas that cannot be explained by random
resampling alone.
<Insert Figure 2 about here>
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4.1.1 Adjusting for backll bias
Some hedge fund studies make the case that the back ll bias articially inates the returns of
hedge funds (Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft, 1999; Posthuma and Van de Sluis, 2003).
This is because hedge funds often include returns for their entire history in the fund databases.
This includes back dated returns for the period prior to a funds listing on the database. Since
hedge fund inclusion in databases is done on a voluntary basis, hedge funds with poor track records
will have a disincentive to report to databases while hedge funds with good track records will have
an incentive to report to databases. Posthuma and Van de Sluis (2003) claim that correcting for
backll bias in the TASS dataset reduces average returns by 4% per annum. In response to these
concerns, we control for backll bias in our bootstrap analysis in a similar fashion to Posthuma and
Van de Sluis (2003). That is, we only include funds in the TASS dataset (since only TASS reports
the date a fund rst lists on the database) and only include a funds return after it starts reporting
to TASS. Hence we remove all the backlled returns from our data sample. Then, we bootstrap the
residuals of the funds from the backll bias free subsample. The results displayed in Table II Panel
B indicate that while the right tail alphas in the backll bias free sample are uniformly smaller
than the right tail alphas in the full sample, luck still cannot explain the over performance of these
extreme hedge funds. The p-values of the alphas and alpha t-statistics of the right tail funds in
Table II Panel B are all below 0.05.
4.1.2 Adjusting for serial correlation
Other hedge fund studies have documented that hedge fund returns are often highly serially corre-
lated, in contrast to mutual fund returns, for example. According to Getsmansky, Lo, and Makarov
(2004), the most likely reason for this serial correlation is fundsilliquidity exposure: hedge funds
trade in securities which are not actively traded and whose market prices are not readily available.
To remove the e¤ect of articial serial correlation induced by illiquidity exposure, we adopt the
methodology pioneered in Okunev and White (2003) to smooth the hedge fund returns and elim-
inate serial correlation of up to order two. Then, we bootstrap the residuals from the smoothed
sample. The results displayed in Table II Panel C are similar to those for the unsmoothed sample.
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The alphas of all the right tail funds cannot be explained by chance. Also the p-values of the alpha
t-statistic of all the right tail funds easily survive the adjustment for serial correlation. We note
however that the alphas and alpha t-statistics of the funds in the right tail are much lower in the
smoothed sample than in the unsmoothed sample. Nonetheless, the results in Panel C suggest
that short term serial correlation cannot explain away the abnormal performance of the top funds.
Unlike the funds in the right tail, some of the funds in the left tail of the alpha and t-statistic
spectrums lose their statistical signicance with the smoothing. In general the results for the funds
in the left tail are not as robust as the results for the funds in the right tail. With the serial
correlation adjustment, we see that the t-statistics are somewhat more robust than the alphas in
the face of perturbations to the estimation procedure.
4.1.3 Adjusting for structural breaks
If the regression coe¢ cients such as alpha and beta in hedge fund performance regressions exhibit
structural breaks over time then constant coe¢ cient regressions and bootstrap results are likely to
be misspecied. Therefore we examine hedge fund returns for evidence of structural breaks.
Theoretically, structural instability can be expected for several reasons. First, changes in the
parameters that relate hedge fund returns to state variables could arise from disappearing market
ine¢ ciencies, major changes in market sentiments, institutional changes, or large macroeconomic
shocks that lead to changes in economic growth or a¤ect risk premia (Paye and Timmermann
(2003)).
Empirically there are reasons to expect instability in nancial time series. Stock and Watson
(1996) examine a large set of nancial and macroeconomic time series, many of which are commonly
used as state variables in nancial models. Andreou and Ghysels (2002a,b) report evidence of breaks
in the comovements of foreign exchange returns and the volatility dynamics of asset returns related
to the Asian and Russian nancial crises. Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) nd evidence of structural
breaks in the US equity premium in the context of a Bayesian framework.
Several recent papers have documented time-variation in the return characteristics of hedge
funds (Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2003)). There is evidence that hedge
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funds change their loadings on di¤erent risk factors over time and that inows into funds a¤ect
subsequent returns. Anecdotal evidence suggests that hedge funds su¤er from sudden shocks such
as the Asian and Russian crisis which can be expected to lead to structural breaks in their return
series.
We therefore wish to examine whether the hedge fund return series exhibit structural breaks and
determine both the number of breaks, K, and estimate the time of their occurrence, (T1; T2; :::; TK):
Bai and Perron (1998) provide a least-squares method for optimally determining the unknown
breakpoints as well as the resulting size of shifts in parameters. In results available upon request,
we apply the Bai and Perron (1998) test to HFR hedge fund return indices and nd that most
categories have a common structural break in December 2000.13 See Appendix B for details of the
Bai and Perron (1998) procedure. The structural break in December 2000 nicely coincides with the
height of the technology bubble in the late 90s.
Based on the structural break evidence in December 2000, we repeat our bootstrap procedure
allowing for a break in the beta slope coe¢ cients using a dummy regression. Panel D of Table II
reports the bootstrap results adjusted for the structural break. The top fund alphas in Panel D
are less extreme than in Panel A of Table II, but they remain statistically signicant. The bottom
funds tend to lose their signicance after adjusting for the structural break. To be fair, the sample
of funds used in the structural break tests are much smaller than those used in the baseline tests
since we require a minimum of 24 months of data before and after the break. Since loser funds tend
to be short-lived, this further reduces the number of loser funds in the test sample.
Overall, the results in this section has shown that, the performance of the extreme top funds
cannot be explained by luck alone. The top funds appear to be overperforming their benchmarks on
a consistent basis. Backll bias, serial correlation of returns, and structural breaks cannot explain
our results. The bottom funds also appear to be underperforming their benchmarks but these
results are not robust to adjustments for a structural break in December 2000.
13HFR hedge fund returns indices are regressed on factor benchmarks. Factor benchmarks are determined for
each hedge fund index category by means of a step-wise regression approach described in Section 3 above. Both the
intercept and the slope coe¢ cients are allowed to vary.
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4.2 Bootstrap results by fund category
In this section we group funds by broad investment category and dead funds by their reasons
for leaving the databases, and then perform the bootstrap test on each subsample. We do so for
two reasons. First, we wish to gauge the robustness of the results from the previous section. One
possibility could be that overperformance in a particular style category is driving our results. If
we nd that most of the right tail funds belong to a particular investment style category then we
are open to the critique that the Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors
may not adequately capture the risks for that style. Such concerns will be moot if we nd instead
that right tail funds in all styles possess alphas and alpha t-statistics that cannot be explained
by chance. Second, it will be interesting to compare the abnormal performance of funds who left
the databases for di¤erent reasons. Such an exercise will have implications on survivorship bias
related issues. Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) nd that while terminated funds
tend to perform worse than the average live fund, funds that stopped reporting tend to perform
better than the average live fund. By excluding terminated and stopped reporting funds from the
analysis, the average performance of the funds in the database may not be very di¤erent due to
the countervailing forces exerted by the exclusion of these two groups of funds. Hence, it will be
useful to characterize the left and right distributions of these groups of funds using the bootstrap
and discuss the implications on survivorship bias.
To group funds by broad investment category, we use the ve broad investment categories
used in Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2004) and discussed in Section 2. We also single out Equity
Long/Short funds as their strategies are particularly easy to understand and as they form the
majority of the hedge funds in 2003. The results displayed in Table III suggests that we can nd
funds that consistently outperform or underperform their benchmarks in every investment category.
Two other observations may be made from the bootstrap results in Table III. First, the best and
worst funds in the sample are directional trader funds. These funds make aggressive bets on the
direction of the market and it is no surprise that the top alpha, top alpha t-statistic, bottom alpha,
and bottom alpha t-statistic funds are all directional trader funds. Second, the extreme positive
alphas for fund of funds are smaller in magnitude than those for the other investment categories.
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One interpretation is that this reects the signicant amount of transactions costs that these funds
incur in moving money into and out of various hedge funds.
<Insert Table III about here>
To group funds that disappeared, we use the death indicator reported in the databases. The
death indicator reveals whether a fund terminated, stopped reporting, or closed. The results of
the bootstrap for the various funds grouped by death reason are reported in Table IV. Consistent
with the results in Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), we nd that funds that stopped
reporting may have either performed well or performed poorly. The former group of funds might
nd that they have garnered so much inows that they no longer need the marketing benets from
reporting to the databases. The latter group of funds may nd that reporting their histories of
poor returns hurt their inows and hence opt to stop reporting. We also nd that consistent with a
priori intuition, the performance of the closed funds as a group seems very strong. While the closed
funds in the right tail do not have spectacular alphas and alpha t-statistics as compared to some of
the funds that stopped reporting, they are nonetheless signicant according to their bootstrapped
p-values. More importantly, more of the left tail closed funds have insignicantly negative alphas.
Finally, we also nd that there exist some funds with consistently positive alphas who terminate
suggesting that hedge funds terminate for reasons other than poor performance.
<Insert Table IV about here>
4.3 Sensitivity analysis of the bootstrap procedure
The results of the previous sections have relied on the simple residual only resampling bootstrap.
Given the complexity of hedge fund strategies, their return series may not fulll the assumptions
underlying the simple bootstrap approach. It remains to see whether our basic inferences change
when we adopt more sophisticated bootstrap techniques that allow for deviations from the above
assumptions. It is to this sensitivity analysis that we now turn.
In this section, we trace out the e¤ects of four alternative bootstrap procedures on our basic
results. They follow closely the bootstrap extensions used in Kosowski et al (2004). Each of these
four procedures are motivated by di¤erent concerns regarding the appropriateness of the basic
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residual only based bootstrap. The rst concern is that there is correlation between the factor
returns and regression residuals. This correlation could occur if the hedge fund managers trade in
securities that have a return co-skewness with the factor returns. Such correlation may also stem
from managerial market- or factor-timing abilities that are not captured by the performance model.
It is important to break any such correlation since the correlation may cloud our inferences on the
signicance of the alpha and alpha t-statistic. Hence, in addition to resampling the residuals,
we also resample the factors. This is known as the factor-residual resampling bootstrap. The
factor resampling is done so across all funds at the same time and is independent of the residual
resampling. See Appendix A for further details on the factor-residual resampling bootstrap.
The second concern is that the residuals are cross-sectionally dependent. This could arise
from funds holding the same securities or from funds following the same trading strategies. Hence
we rene our residual-only bootstrap procedure to accommodate cross-sectional dependence in
residuals. Rather than drawing sequences of time periods that are unique to each fund, for each
bootstrap iteration, we draw T time periods from the set ft = 1; :::; Tg, then resample the residuals
from this reindexed time sequence across all funds, thereby preserving any cross-sectional correlation
in the residuals. Since some funds may as a result be allocated bootstrap index entries from periods
they did not exist, we omit a fund if it does not have at least 30 observations after applying the
bootstrap index.
The third concern is that there may exist a persistent factor that is not accounted for by the
Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2001) multi-factor models. If the reason why funds
have high alphas is because they load on this omitted factor then we may be lead erroneously to
conclude that fund managers have security selection ability if we do not include the omitted factor
in our performance measurement model. This may be more of a concern for hedge funds than for
mutual funds since hedge funds follow a wider range of trading strategies. One way to rectify this is
to use a Monte Carlo simulation to simulate an omitted factor. The basic idea is that a persistent
and common source of variation in fund residuals attributable to a hypothetical missing factor may
be modelled as a slow mean-reverting process such as an AR(1) process. Hence we simulate such
a factor and redo the residual resampling bootstrap on the performance model augmented with
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the simulated omitted factor. Details of the construction of the omitted factor are available in
Appendix C.
The fourth and last concern is that the residual only resampling bootstrap requires the working
assumption that conditional on factor realizations, the residuals are independently and identically
distributed (henceforth I.I.D.). This may not seem like such as strong assumption given that it
allows for conditional time series dependence of returns through the time series behavior of the
factors, and that the simple bootstrap has some robustness properties that apply even if the I.I.D.
assumption is violated (Hall (1992)). Nonetheless, to allow explicitly for the time series dependence
in the residuals, we follow the stationary bootstrap procedure suggested by Politis and Romano
(1994). Basically, the stationary bootstrap requires resampling of data blocks of random length to
form pseudo time series. The data block length are generated from a geometric distribution whose
mean is 1/q where q is a parameter specied by the econometrician. We choose q from the set f0:1;
0:5; 1g and repeat the stationary bootstrap procedure three times for blocks of average length =
10, 2, and 1. The results from these four extensions of the simple residual resampling bootstrap
are presented in Table V.
<Insert Table V about here>
We see that the bootstrapped p-values for the extreme funds are not strongly a¤ected by the
di¤erent extensions. The p-values for the best and worst alpha appears to be more sensitive to
variation in the bootstrap methodology than the p-values for the alpha t-statistics. Nonetheless,
all the bootstrapped p-values for the best and worst alpha fund are still below 0.01. The results in
Table V clearly suggest that our conclusion of signicant security selection ability amongst hedge
fund managers is robust to the choice of the bootstrap methodology.
4.4 An alternative Bayesian approach
Compared to return series on equity indices such as the S&P 500, the average hedge fund has a
relatively short time series. This necessarily reduces the precision with which performance mea-
sures such as alpha can be estimated. However, as Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) (henceforth PS)
point out, it is possible to substantially improve the alpha estimates by using historical returns on
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seemingly-unrelatedassets not used in the denition of the alpha performance measure. These
so-called non-benchmark passive assets have longer time series than the benchmark series and are
correlated with hedge fund returns. The correlation between the hedge fund and non-benchmark
passive returns can be exploited to improve our alpha estimates independent of whether these pas-
sive returns are priced by the benchmarks. PS use seemingly unrelated asset returns to improve
the precision of alpha estimates of mutual funds.14 Given that the average hedge fund has a much
shorter returns series than the average mutual fund, the application of this methodology to hedge
funds is even more relevant than to mutual funds. By using information on passive non-return
benchmarks, we can in fact double the length of the time series used for estimating alphas.
Stambaugh (1997) shows how assets with longer historical time series provide information about
the moments of assets with shorter histories. We follow the PS methodology and regress non-
benchmark passive returns on benchmark returns. Let FNm;t denote the m  1 vector of non-
benchmark passive asset returns in month t on the k benchmark returns FBk;t:
FNt = bN + KX
k=1
bNk FBk;t +bNt (4)
Importantly bNt in Equation 1 and bNt in Equation 4 are allowed to be correlated. PS show that
the improvement in the estimation of alpha performance measure does not depend on whether the
benchmarks FBk;t perfectly price the non-benchmark passive assets F
N
m;t or not. We also dene the
regression of a fund is return on p(= m+ k) benchmark and non-benchmark assets:
Rit =
bi + MX
m=1
bc0iNm Fm;t + KX
k=1
bc0iBk FBk;t + buit; for i = 1; :::; L (5)
Using Equation 1 and the assumption that FBk;t is uncorrelated with both bNt and buit, PS show
that
i = i + c
0
iNN . (6)
PS also show how to derive the posterior estimate ei of i in Equation 6 from the posterior moments
of i, c0iN , and N . PS provide analytical expressions for the posterior moments ei, ei, ec0iN , and
14They nd a median di¤erence between their Bayesian posterior alphas and the OLS alphas of 2.3% per annum
for all funds and of 8.1% for small-company growth funds.
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eN . As we show below, the posterior alpha estimate ei is below the OLS alpha bi from equation
1 for 19 out of the top 20 Equity Long/Short hedge funds.
In the application of the Bayesian framework, several choices regarding the choice of fund
returns, benchmark series, and non-benchmark series need to be made. We follow PS and apply
an empiricalBayesian approach to estimate the prior distribution of various variables. The prior
distribution of the covariance matrix of bNt in equation 4. denoted by  is specied as an inverted
Wishart distribution,
 1 W (H 1; ):
We follow PS in specifying the empirical estimates of the priors. We set the degrees of freedom
 = m + 3 which implies that the prior contains very little information about : Moreover, we
specify H = s2(   m   1)Im; and E() = s2Im: The value of s2 is set equal to the average of
the diagonal elements of the sample estimates of  obtained using OLS regressions in equation 4.
The parameters in equation 5 are specied as follows. The prior for 2u, the variance of ui;t; is an
inverted gamma distribution or
2u 
0s
2
0
20
; (7)
where 20 represents a chi-square variate with 0 degrees of freedom. We dene cL = (c
0
LNc
0
LB)
0.
Conditional on 2u, the priors for L and cL are set to be normal distributions, independent of each
other:
Lj2u  N

0;

2u
E (2u)

2

; (8)
and
cLj2u  N

c0;

2u
E (2u)

c

: (9)
where 2 represents the marginal prior variance of L and c , the marginal prior covariance of
cL. We set 2 = 1 (implemented by using a very large value computationally). As PS point
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out, this implies that the prior for A is di¤use and the prior mean of 0 does not play a role.
We specify the values for s0, 0, c0, and c in equations 7, 8, and 9 using an empirical Bayes
approach explained in detail in PS. The intution for this approach is that for any particular fund i
in question, we determine the prior distributions of the parameters of interest by examining funds
j that are similar to fund i. PS dene funds to be similar when they have the same investment
objective. However, since our hedge funds have di¤erent benchmarks and the Equity Long/Short
funds that we are interested in belong to the same investment objective we require an alternative
denition of the set of similar funds. Thus we dene funds j = 1; :::; J as similar when they share
the same benchmark factor FBk;t from the step-wise regression which chooses a funds benchmarks
FBk;t.
15 We use cross-sectional averages from the regression results for funds j = 1; :::; J to dene
the prior uncertainty about a parameter for fund i: The prior mean and covariance matrix of cL
are denoted by c0 and c respectively:
Following PS, all of our estimates are based on di¤use or completely non-informative priors.16
As non-benchmark passive assets we use the following four time-series: the returns on the top three
excluded factors from the stepwise regression for each fund in addition to the HFR Long/Short
Equity index. The limited number of benchmark factors is motivated by the observation of PS
that if the number of non-benchmark assets increases without a su¢ cient increase in R2 then the
posterior alpha estimate may be less precise. We follow PSs suggestion that a di¤erent set of
non-benchmark assets could be used for each fund i: As PS point out, the non-benchmark passive
factor should be highly correlated with fund returns, a condition fullled by the HFR Long/Short
Equity index.
<Insert Table VI about here>
Table VI reports the estimates of posterior alpha estimate ei and the OLS alpha bi (from
equation 1). The rst column reports the OLS alpha estimate. Columns two to four report the
posterior alpha estimate (from the seemingly unrelated assets approach) for di¤erent values of the
prior of N . Columns ve to seven report the di¤erences between the OLS alpha and the posterior
15We require similar funds j to share the rst benchmark factor FBk;twith fund i if fund i has only one (k = 1)
benchmark factor and to share the rst two benchmark factors if fund i has more than one benchmark factor (k > 1).
16 As PS point out the Bayesian framework can also accomodate informative beliefs.
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alpha. Column eight reports the number of monthly observations for each fund and columns nine
and ten report the start and end dates of the fund. As can be seen the alpha is reduced in 19 out of
20 cases and the median of the percentage of the alpha reduction is about 41% when compared to
the OLS alpha. This shows that using longer time-series provides important information and that
the short-sample period OLS alphas are overestimating actual performance. Although there is no
evidence refuting the statistical signicance of the top fund alphas from the bootstrap analysis, the
Bayesian results suggest that caution must be exercised when evaluating those alphas.
5 Taking advantage of the abnormal performance of hedge funds
5.1 A case study: The top twenty Equity Long/Short funds
Thus far we have presented evidence which suggest that the performance of the top hedge funds
cannot be attributed to luck. These funds appear to be able to deliver superior performance on
a consistent basis. In this section, we take a closer look at the top twenty funds based on alpha.
Our ultimate aim is to see whether one can form an investment strategy that takes advantage of
the fundssuperior returns. If the top funds are small, closed to new investments, and their high
alphas driven by a few stellar return data points, then it does not bode well for potential investors
of hedge funds hoping to prot from the documented abnormal performance. For the case study,
we conne our analysis to Equity Long/Short funds as these funds form the largest group of funds
and their returns are most easily captured by the factor models of Agarwal and Naik (2004) and
Fung and Hsieh (2001).
The summary statistics for the top twenty equity long short funds are showcased on Table VII.
We report the following for each fund: alpha, bootstrap p value, R2, mean return, standard devi-
ation of returns, maximum monthly return, minimum monthly return, adjusted alpha/alpha, fund
factors selected using the stepwise regression algorithm, fund status, start assets under management
(henceforth AUM), end AUM, and mean fund inow. Adjusted alpha is the alpha of the fund after
removing the top three return observations. Fund status indicates whether a fund is still livein
the databases, or whether it has terminated, stopped reporting, or closed. Because a fund may be
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e¤ectively closed (i.e., it no long accepts any new inows) but still reporting to the databases, we
examine the start and end AUMs to gauge the size of the funds as well as analyze the mean fund
inow to ascertain whether a fund has e¤ectively stopped accepting new inows
<Insert Table VII about here>
Three salient observations may be made from the summary statistics in Table VII. First, fund
alpha is driven mostly by the extreme return observations. On average, the top three return
observations contribute close to 40% of fund alpha. There are six funds for whom adjusted alpha
makes up less than 50% of alpha. In fact, for the top fourteenth fund, the adjusted alpha is
negative. The low adjusted alpha/alpha numbers are corroborated by the high standard deviations
and the large extreme return values reported in Table VII. Second, some of the funds have stopped
reporting to the databases. Of the twenty funds, six funds have stopped reporting while two funds
have been terminated. Third, the inows for these funds are very small. The median monthly
inow is about 4% for these funds. If we took funds with inow below 2% of AUM as e¤ectively
closed, then there are nine funds which are e¤ectively closed. Further, seven of these nine funds are
still reporting to the databases. The ending assets under management column of Table VII reveals
that many of these funds remained small (AUM < 100 million) over their sample period despite
their stellar returns, further suggesting that many of them are e¤ectively closed. As a robustness
check, we also examine the average pairwise alpha correlations between the top funds. If there was
evidence that their rolling alphas are correlated and funds outperform at the same time, this might
point to a missing factor in the regression model. The average pairwise correlation between the
top fundsrolling alphas is 0.07. This, in addition to our omitted factor robustness checks above,
provides further evidence against the possibility of a missing factor. Overall, the results in Table
VII suggests that it will not be straight forward to take advantage of the superior returns of the
top funds as a large part of their alpha is driven by extreme data points. Even if one can identify
the good funds early on these funds are small and may no longer accept new fund inows making
any investment strategy di¢ cult.
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5.2 Persistence tests of fund alpha
To complete our analysis of whether investors can prot from the observed abnormal performance,
it remains to test whether the alphas of hedge funds persist. The bootstrap results suggest that
managers with superior alphas are not just lucky. This implies that these managers possess a
certain element of skill, which in turn implies that fund alphas should persist at some horizon,
assuming that managerial skill persists and that managerial tenure is long enough. Yet, the results
from the case study in the previous subsection suggest that those superior alphas are driven by a
few spectacular return data points (which may not persist) and belong to funds that are typically
small and potentially closed to new inows.
Performance persistence is an age old topic in the mutual fund literature. Hendricks, Patel,
and Zeckhauser (1993) among others show that mutual fund returns persist in the medium term
(one to three years). However Carhart (1997) shows that this is either due to managers adopting
momentum strategies or to the persistence of fund expenses. The latter result stems from the
fact that this years winners tend to be winners because they charge low expenses. Conversely,
this years losers tend to be losers because they charge high expenses. However, newer studies like
Kosowski et al (2004), and Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2004) show that more sophisticated
econometric methods allow one to pick out funds whose returns cannot be explained by four factor
covariation or expense ratios. With hedge funds though, previous studies have found little evidence
of persistence in returns. Agarwal and Naik (2000) show that hedge fund returns only persist in the
short term (one to three months). Getsmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) credit that to illiquidity
induced by the assets that hedge funds trade. Like Agarwal and Naik (2000), Brown, Goetzmann,
and Ibbotson (1999) nd no evidence of persistence in hedge fund returns at annual horizons. What
of hedge fund alphas?
To test the persistence properties of hedge fund alphas, we rst estimate individual fund rolling
alphas using the stepwise regression approach and the factor models of Agarwal and Naik (2004)
and Fung and Hsieh (2001). That is, we estimate individual fund alphas from past 36 months of
return data (or a minimum of 30 months of return data) in the spirit of Carhart (1997). Then,
we sort the funds into decile portfolios each month based on the alphas calculated over the past
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36 months and evaluate average fund alpha estimated over the next 36 months for each of the
portfolios. The spread between the mean fund alpha of decile 1 (highest alpha funds) and the mean
fund alpha of decile 10 (lowest alpha funds) is presented in the rst column and top two rows of
Table VIII. Since we use overlapping three year periods to estimate the formation and evaluation
period alphas (to maximize data), we compute the t-statistics from Newey-West (1987) standard
errors to correct for the possible serial correlation.17 We analyze average decile fund alpha as
opposed to decile portfolio alpha in the evaluation period to allow the factors and factor loadings
to vary across the diverse set of hedge funds within each decile portfolio.
<Insert Table VIII about here>
We nd, from the results in Table VIII, that the alpha di¤erences persist over the formation
and evaluation period of three years. The alpha spread between the best alpha decile and the
worst alpha decile is a modest 0.22% per month or 2.7% per year. Moreover, this alpha spread
is statistically signicant at the 1% level. Can investors take advantage of this persistence? We
tackle this question in three parts. First, we examine the persistence of the value-weighted fund
alpha spread. Instead of taking the average fund alpha, we weight fund alpha by fund assets under
management (AUM). Table VIII reports that the value-weighted alpha spread is insignicant from
zero suggesting that small funds drive the bulk of the alpha persistence. Second, we split the
sample into small and large funds based on AUM at the start of the evaluation period. Small funds
are funds with AUM less than the median AUM. Large funds are funds with AUM greater than
the median AUM. Then we redo the persistence test on small and large funds separately. The
results in Table VIII again suggest that small funds are responsible for much of the performance
persistence. Third, we split the sample into closed and open funds based on mean fund inow over
the evaluation period. Closed funds are funds with mean inow less than the median inow over
the evaluation period. Open funds are funds with mean inow greater than the median inow. We
then redo the persistence analysis on each subset of funds. The results strongly indicate that the
persistence is concentrated in funds that experience very little inows and who may be e¤ectively
17Note that there is no overlap between formation and evaluation period but only overlap between successive
evaluation periods and successive formation periods.
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closed. For those funds, the alpha spread is an economically and statistically signicant 4.35% per
year which is more than 2.5 times the alpha spread of 1.66% per year generated with open funds.
Overall, the persistence tests suggest that because abnormal performance / persistence is driven
mostly by small and e¤ectively closed funds, it will not be easy for investors to take advantage of
the abnormal performance and performance persistence. This dovetails with the insights obtained
from the case study in the previous subsection.
One concern with the persistence tests thus far may be that the imputation of fees is clouding
the analysis. It could be that the funds in the top decile persist because they charge low incentive
and managerial fees, while the funds in the bottom decile continue to do poorly post-fee wise
because they charge high incentive and managerial fees. In response to these concerns, we add
back the incentive and managerial fees to obtain pre-fee returns, calculate the pre-fee alphas, and
redo the sorts. The results with these pre-fee alphas in the bottom two rows of Table VIII are
qualitatively similar to those with the post-fee alphas.
6 Conclusion
The results in this study has done much to forward the view that managers are responsible for
the superior performance of some hedge funds. Using a non-parametric bootstrap methodology,
we nd that extreme fund alphas cannot be explained by luck alone. This is more the case for
extreme right tail funds than for extreme left tail funds. That is, it is easier to attribute poor
performance to a stroke of bad fortune. Our bootstrap methodology features numerous extensions,
including extensions for an omitted factor, for cross-sectional dependence, and for independent
factor resampling. We obtain similar results despite implementing controls for back ll bias, serial
correlation, and structural breaks. It is therefore not surprising that we nd persistence in fund
alpha over horizons of three years.
However, two caveats are in order. First, the performance persistence is driven mostly by
small funds who experience very little inows and hence may be closed to new investments. Hence
any investment strategy designed to take advantage of the persistence will encounter di¢ culties.
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Second, Bayesian tests suggest that the average abnormal performance of the top funds may be
overestimated by 41% with the conventional OLS approach.
7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Bootstrap extension - Residual and factor resampling
Kosowski et al (2004) argue that independent resampling of regression residuals and factor returns
breaks any correlation between these two components. Such a correlation would occur, for example,
if a fund manager holds stocks having a return co-skewness with the market, or with other factor
returns. Co-skewness may also occur if the manager has market- or factor-timing abilities that are
not properly specied in the performance model. Breaking any such correlation may signicantly
change inferences about the signicance of alpha, thus, following Kosowski et al (2004) we employ
independent residual and factor resampling as an alternative approach.
For residual and factor resampling, we augment the residual resampling procedure with factor
returns that are resampled independently of the residuals. When resampling these factor returns,
the same draw is used across all funds, giving the following data for bootstrap iteration b for fund
i:
f
KX
k=1
bikF bk;t; t =  b1;  b2; :::;  bTig and fbbi;t; t = sb1; sb2; :::; sbTig
Resampling factor returns as well as residuals allows for sampling variation in the coe¢ cient esti-
mates, f
KX
k=1
bikg, that results from using a particular draw of factor realizations, as well as residuals,
over the sample period.
Next, for each bootstrap iteration, b, a time-series of (bootstrapped) monthly net returns is
constructed for fund i, again imposing the null hypothesis of zero true performance (i = 0):
fRbi;t =
KX
k=1
bikF bk;t +bbi;t , tF =  b1;  b2; :::;  bTi
and t = sb1; s
b
2; :::; s
b
Tig;
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where  b1; 
b
2; :::; 
b
Ti
and sb1; s
b
2; :::; s
b
Ti
are the (matched) time reorderings imposed by resampling the
factor returns and residuals, respectively, in bootstrap iteration b.
Repeating these steps across funds, i = 1; :::; L, and bootstrap iterations, b = 1; :::; B, we then
build the cross-sectional distribution of the alpha estimates, bbi , or their t-statistics, btbbi , resulting
purely from sampling variation, as we impose the null of no abnormal performance. Bootstrapping
the distribution of the maximum btb proceeds similarly. If we nd that very few of the bootstrap
iterations generate a maximum b, or btb; as high as that observed in the actual (unmodied) data,
this suggests that sampling variation (luck) is not the source of performance, but that genuine
skills actually exist. In all of our bootstrap tests to follow, we execute 1,000 bootstrap iterations
(B = 1; 000).
7.2 Appendix B: Structural break test
Bai and Perron (1998) provide a least-squares method for optimally determining the unknown
breakpoints as well as the resulting size of shifts in parameters. Their approach is based on searching
over the possible K partitions (T1; T2; :::; TK) of the data to compute the minimizer of the sume
of squared residuals. For a set of K breakpoints, (T1; T2; :::; TK) =fTjg; the coe¢ cients k;fTjg are
chosen to minimize the sum of squared residuals
ST (fTjg) =
K+1X
k=1
TkX
T=Tk 1+1
(rt   b0k;fTjgFk;t)2
The resulting break dates( bT1; bT2; :::; bTK) are selected so as to satisfy
( bT1; bT2; :::; bTK) = arg min
T2;T2;::;TK
ST (T1; :::; TK);
where the minimization is over all partitions such as Tk Tk 1  T: The trimming percentage
parameter  imposes a minimum length for the time between breaks, T .Choosing  in practice
involves a trade-o¤ between the ability to detect regimes of relatively short length and the desire
to avoid overtting the data and simply identifying outliers. Bai and Perron (2000) discuss
computational and practical aspects of determining these design parameters.
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In results available from the authors upon request we examine structural break tests for di¤erent
trimming percentages. In the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity Bai and Perron
(1998) advocate the use of a trimming percentage of 15%. As the diagnostics in Table 1 show there
is overwhelming evidence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in hedge fund returns. We
therefore choose the trimming percentage of 15% as our preferred mode.
Several recent papers have contributed to the structural break literature but their application is
beyond the scope of this paper. These papers include Andrews (2003) which addresses the issue of
identifying breaks at the end of the sample period, and Elliot and Mueller (2004), which contribute
to the determination of condence intervals for structural breaks. Hansen (2000) derives the large
sample distributions of several test statistics for structural breaks allowing for structural change in
the marginal distribution of the regressors and proposes a xed regressor bootstrapfor determining
the critical values under the null hypothesis. However this test does not permit multiple breaks in
the regression coe¢ cients.
7.3 Appendix C: Monte carlo simulation of persistent sources of variation in
fund residuals
Kosowski et al (2004) modify the baseline bootstrap procedure to account for persistent sources
of variation in fund residuals. Their procedure is based on the fact that a persistent and common
source of variation in fund residuals driven by a hypothetical missing factor can be modelled as a
slowly mean-reverting process such as an AR(1) process. Their bootstrap variation is based on a
Monte Carlo simulation of the e¤ect that such a factor would have if it was present in the residuals
as a result of being omitted from the factor model.
Kosowski et al (2004) show that the presence of an omitted factor OFt in residuals in a multi-
factor model (with 4 factors, for example) can be modelled as follows
rit = i + 1if1t + :::+ 3if3t + 4if4t + 5iOFt + "it; (10)
so that the residuals are the sum of the common omitted factor, OFt, and the fund-specic (idio-
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syncratic) shocks "it :
uit = 5iOFt + "it: (11)
A missing factor such as an oil factor would have to be persistent to a¤ect funds di¤erently over
time. Kosowski et al (2004) show that its dynamics can be captured through the following AR(1)
process:
OFt = OFt 1 + et; (12)
where  is the persistence parameter. This would make the omitted factor slowly mean-reverting.
Funds with positive exposure to OFt (5i > 0) operating during a period where its mean was
positive would see their  estimates articially increased, while funds with a positive exposure to
OFt operating at times whenOFt is negative would see a negative contribution to their  estimates.
We following the Monte Carlo procedure proposed by Kosowski et al (2004) to show the robustness
of our results to potential persistent source of variation in fund residuals. For details see the
appendix of Kosowski et al (2004).
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Figure 1: Composition of combined hedge fund database. The sample period is from 
January 1990 to December 2002. Funds with assets under management > US$20 million. 
Figure 2. Kernel density estimate of the bootstrapped (dotted line) and the actual (solid line) alpha distributions for all funds. The sample period is from January 1990 to
December 2002. 
test of normality test of heteroscedasticity test of serial correlation (AR1)
median kurtosis median skewness % with Jarque Bera p- value <0.1 % with Breusch Pagan p- value <0.1 % with Ljung Box p- value <0.1 
Long/short Equity Funds 3.57 -0.97 75.86 34.48 37.93
Directional Trader Funds 3.54 -0.45 65.28 15.28 62.50
Multi-process Funds 3.91 0.13 63.64 36.36 27.27
Relative Value Funds 4.34 0.07 30.00 14.00 14.00
Security Selection Funds 3.57 -0.06 48.78 13.41 32.93
Fund of funds 3.91 -0.04 52.58 27.84 36.08
summary statistics
Summary Statistics and Tests of Normality, Heteroskedasticity, and Serial Correlation on Hedge Fund Residuals
Table I
The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2002. The distributional properties of hedge fund return residuals are reported via summary statistics on kurtosis and
skewness. Tests of normality are conducted using the Jarque Bera test. Tests of heteroscedasticity are conducted with the Breusch Pagan test. And tests of serial correlation are
conducted with the Ljung Box test. All tests are conducted on fund residuals. The percentage of funds with p -values which reject the null at the 10% confidence level is reported
in each test. Fund residuals are obtained by regressing fund returns in excess of the risk free rate on the Agarwal and Naik (2004) option-based factors and the Fung and Hsieh
(2001) factors.
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -5.39 -4.93 -3.62 -3.16 -3.13 -1.86 -0.99 -0.67 -0.31 1.59 2.10 2.57 3.59 4.70 5.20 5.65 5.68 7.35
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
t -alpha -7.63 -7.60 -7.43 -6.99 -6.53 -3.51 -2.45 -1.76 -0.82 4.67 5.96 6.84 9.11 16.46 20.45 23.01 25.47 42.23
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -2.28 -1.23 -0.90 -0.86 -0.69 -0.90 -0.49 -0.41 -0.15 1.14 1.46 1.78 3.05 2.54 3.05 3.18 3.39 3.49
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.01 0.09 0.22 0.04 0.17 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t -alpha -2.70 -2.43 -2.30 -2.03 -1.78 -2.30 -1.51 -0.96 -0.36 4.27 5.25 5.87 8.57 7.15 8.57 8.95 9.71 9.83
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -2.47 -2.34 -1.59 -1.53 -1.40 -1.05 -0.56 -0.37 -0.09 1.39 1.85 2.07 2.68 4.02 4.11 4.16 4.24 4.48
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.43 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t -alpha -3.74 -3.54 -3.38 -3.29 -3.04 -2.28 -1.39 -0.98 -0.29 4.67 5.89 6.84 9.97 13.31 13.36 15.29 19.41 27.43
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel A: Basic model on full sample of hedge funds
the slope coefficients.  Structural breaks were identified using the Bai and Perron (1998) test. 
Table II
Statistical significance of the best and worst hedge funds' performance
The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2002. The first and second rows report the OLS estimate of alpha in percent per month and the bootstrapped p -value of
alpha. Alpha is estimated relative to the Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors. The third and fourth rows report the t -statistic of alpha based on
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors as well as the bootstrapped p -value of the t -statistic. The first column on the left (right) reports funds with the
lowest (highest) alpha and t -statistic followed by the results for the funds with the second lowest (highest) alpha and t -statistic and marginal funds at different percentiles in the
left (right) tail of the distribution. The p -value is based on the distribution of the best (worst) funds in 1000 bootstrap resamples. The results in Panel A are for the full sample of
hedge funds returns. The results in Panel B are for the sample of fund returns which have been corrected for serial correlation of up to order 2 using the method of Okunev and
White. (2003). Panel C reports bootstrap results after removing the backfilled returns.   Panel D reports results from a dummy regression model that allows for   structural breaks in 
Panel B: Basic model after adjusting for serial correlation (Okunev and White, 2003)
Panel C: Basic model after adjusting for backfill bias
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -1.38 -0.80 -0.76 -0.76 -0.68 -0.49 -0.06 0.11 0.32 1.68 2.06 2.32 2.78 3.24 3.24 3.29 3.31 3.52
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.12 0.25 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.46 0.38 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t -alpha -1.86 -1.56 -1.55 -1.34 -1.33 -0.81 -0.11 0.21 0.85 7.42 8.91 10.16 13.10 15.68 15.68 16.23 16.84 19.47
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.26 0.48 0.42 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel D: Basic model with structural break in Dec 2000 identified using the Bai and Perron (1998) test
Table II (continued)
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -3.16 -2.85 -2.64 -2.54 -2.46 -2.01 -1.27 -0.75 -0.36 1.87 2.34 3.00 3.80 4.29 4.32 4.44 4.70 5.68
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
t -alpha -4.21 -3.95 -3.73 -3.57 -3.19 -3.14 -2.52 -1.99 -0.83 4.09 5.06 5.91 9.11 11.47 11.68 14.15 14.44 16.46
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -5.39 -3.07 -2.94 -2.61 -2.11 -2.11 -1.36 -0.88 -0.39 2.11 2.72 2.91 3.63 3.95 4.33 4.34 4.49 7.35
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t -alpha -7.63 -7.60 -4.54 -3.62 -3.22 -3.22 -2.50 -1.94 -0.98 4.26 5.03 5.69 6.69 6.76 7.23 7.44 7.54 42.23
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -1.93 -1.89 -1.35 -0.82 -0.80 -1.89 -0.77 -0.67 -0.24 1.04 1.52 2.00 2.48 2.18 2.42 2.48 2.58 2.66
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t -alpha -5.27 -3.65 -3.62 -3.30 -3.06 -3.65 -2.61 -2.08 -0.75 5.39 6.77 7.34 9.70 8.89 9.07 9.70 9.82 10.80
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -2.07 -1.97 -1.54 -1.35 -1.06 -1.35 -0.71 -0.53 -0.24 1.32 1.58 1.93 2.95 2.95 3.09 3.36 3.37 4.61
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
t -alpha -5.26 -5.22 -3.84 -3.56 -3.29 -3.56 -2.40 -1.61 -0.71 6.08 7.07 8.64 13.19 13.19 14.79 20.45 23.01 25.47
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Directional Trader Funds
Panel C: Multi-process Funds
Panel D: Relative Value Funds
Table III
Statistical significance of the best and worst hedge funds' performance grouped by investment types
The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2002. The first and second rows report the OLS estimate of alpha in percent per month and the bootstrapped p -value of
alpha. Alpha is estimated relative to the Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors. The third and fourth rows report the t -statistic of alpha based on
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors as well as the bootstrapped p -value of the t -statistic. The first column on the left (right) reports funds with the
lowest (highest) alpha and t -statistic followed by the results for the funds with the second lowest (highest) alpha and t -statistic and marginal funds at different percentiles in the
left (right) tail of the distribution. The p -value is based on the distribution of the best (worst) funds in 1000 bootstrap resamples. Each panel showcases the results for the
subsample of funds in a specific investment style category.
Panel A: Long Short Equity Funds
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -4.93 -3.16 -2.85 -2.64 -2.54 -2.33 -1.24 -0.75 -0.36 1.84 2.33 2.99 3.80 4.43 4.44 4.70 5.65 5.68
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
t -alpha -7.43 -6.99 -4.21 -3.95 -3.73 -3.45 -2.46 -1.87 -0.81 4.05 4.95 5.61 8.53 11.47 11.68 14.15 14.44 16.46
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -2.45 -1.94 -1.37 -1.17 -1.15 -1.17 -0.75 -0.58 -0.22 0.86 1.04 1.28 1.67 1.67 1.72 1.87 2.04 2.49
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
t -alpha -6.53 -4.18 -4.13 -4.12 -3.87 -4.12 -3.35 -2.10 -1.21 4.80 6.32 7.00 8.82 8.82 8.93 9.39 10.72 12.37
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel F: Fund of Funds
Table III (continued)
Panel E: Security Selection Funds
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -5.39 -2.94 -1.89 -1.64 -1.57 -2.94 -1.57 -1.34 -0.69 1.63 1.93 2.64 2.91 2.70 2.75 2.91 4.18 5.65
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t -alpha -4.54 -4.18 -3.65 -3.35 -3.29 -4.18 -3.29 -2.74 -2.23 4.17 5.65 7.14 8.22 7.22 7.25 8.22 11.47 13.19
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -3.07 -2.42 -2.33 -2.11 -1.35 -2.42 -1.35 -1.02 -0.53 1.85 2.61 3.05 4.32 3.52 3.59 4.32 4.44 4.70
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
t -alpha -6.99 -3.84 -3.45 -3.00 -2.80 -3.84 -2.52 -2.34 -1.39 5.60 6.77 8.07 12.37 10.11 10.80 12.37 14.79 25.47
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bottom 2. 3. 4. 5. 1% 3% 4% 10% 10% 5% 3% 1% 5. 4. 3. 2. Top
alpha (%) -2.64 -0.99 -0.30 -0.24 -0.07 -2.64 -2.64 -2.64 -0.99 1.87 2.76 2.76 2.83 1.67 1.83 1.87 2.76 2.83
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.43 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00
t -alpha -3.95 -2.68 -0.73 -0.23 -0.15 -3.95 -3.95 -3.95 -2.68 6.16 6.76 6.76 42.23 5.36 5.52 6.16 6.76 42.23
p -value (bootstrapped) 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.43 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Funds that stopped reporting
Panel C: Funds that closed
Table IV
Statistical significance of the best and worst dead hedge funds' performance grouped by death reason
The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2002. The first and second rows report the OLS estimate of alpha in percent per month and the bootstrapped p -value of
alpha. Alpha is estimated relative to the Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors. The third and fourth rows report the t -statistic of alpha based on
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors as well as the bootstrapped p -value of the t -statistic. The first column on the left (right) reports funds with the
lowest (highest) alpha and t -statistic followed by the results for the funds with the second lowest (highest) alpha and t -statistic and marginal funds at different percentiles in the
left (right) tail of the distribution. The p -value is based on the distribution of the best (worst) funds in 1000 bootstrap resamples. Each panel showcases the results for the
subsample of dead funds who left the databases for a specific reason. 
Panel A: Funds that were terminated
Factor-Residual Cross-sectional Omitted Factor
Resampling Bootstrap Bootstrap q=0.1 q=0.5 q=1
alpha (%) 7.352 7.352 7.352 7.352 7.352 7.352
p-value (boostrapped) 0.007 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Factor-Residual Cross-sectional Omitted Factor
Resampling Bootstrap Bootstrap q=0.1 q=0.5 q=1
alpha t-statistic (%) 42.233 42.233 42.233 42.233 42.233 42.233
p-value (boostrapped) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Factor-Residual Cross-sectional Omitted Factor
Resampling Bootstrap Bootstrap q=0.1 q=0.5 q=1
alpha (%) -5.386 -5.386 -5.386 -5.386 -5.386 -5.386
p-value (boostrapped) 0.002 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Factor-Residual Cross-sectional Omitted Factor
Resampling Bootstrap Bootstrap q=0.1 q=0.5 q=1
alpha t-statistic (%) -7.629 -7.629 -7.629 -7.629 -7.629 -7.629
p-value (boostrapped) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Panel D: Sensitivity Analysis of the Worst Alpha t-statistic Fund's Performance
Politis and Romano (1994) Stationary Bootstrap
This table reports sensitivity analyses of the statistical significance of the worst and the best fund's performance to various bootstrap procedures. Column 1 reports
results from factor-residual resampling instead of residual resampling. Column 2 reports results from a cross-sectional boostrap where the bootstrap index is the same
for all funds for each boostrap. Column 3 reports results from a bootstrap that allows for the presence of a persistent omitted factor. Columns 4 to 6 reports results for
the Politis and Romano (1994) stationary bootstrap using various smoothing parameters q. The p-values are based on the distribution of the best and worst fund's in the
1000 bootstrapped samples. Performance is measured relative to the Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors.
Politis and Romano (1994) Stationary Bootstrap
Panel B: Sensitivity Analysis of the Best Alpha t-statistic Fund's Performance
Politis and Romano (1994) Stationary Bootstrap
Panel C: Sensitivity Analysis of the Worst Alpha Fund's Performance
Table V
Bootstrap Procedure Sensitivity Analysis
Panel A: Sensitivity Analysis of the Best Alpha Fund's Performance
Politis and Romano (1994) Stationary Bootstrap
αSURA for σαN  of (αOLS-αSURA) for σαN  of No. of start end
fund αOLS (% p.m.) 0.00 0.02 ∞ 0.00 0.02 ∞ obs. date date
1 5.68 4.20 4.21 4.32 1.48 1.47 1.36 33 Mar 00 Dec 02
2 4.70 2.40 2.40 2.41 2.30 2.30 2.30 40 Jul 97 Oct 00
3 4.45 2.73 2.74 2.78 1.72 1.71 1.67 50 Feb 95 Jan 01
4 4.32 0.97 1.10 1.55 3.35 3.22 2.77 30 Jul 98 Dec 00
5 4.30 2.34 2.37 3.14 1.95 1.93 1.16 43 Mar 99 Dec 02
6 4.18 1.40 1.55 1.73 2.78 2.64 2.46 34 Jan 97 Oct 99
7 3.80 2.13 2.11 0.68 1.67 1.68 3.12 34 May 99 Dec 02
8 3.75 2.60 2.58 2.51 1.15 1.17 1.24 80 Jan 96 Dec 02
9 3.64 1.61 1.62 2.02 2.02 2.02 1.62 47 Jan 99 Dec 02
10 3.60 0.27 0.28 0.32 3.33 3.32 3.28 72 Jan 97 Dec 02
11 3.60 3.06 3.07 3.09 0.53 0.53 0.51 39 May 98 Dec 02
12 3.52 3.21 3.21 3.21 0.31 0.31 0.31 35 May 98 Apr 01
13 3.18 -0.12 -0.16 -0.98 3.30 3.34 4.16 61 Mar 97 Dec 02
14 3.11 2.36 2.36 2.36 0.75 0.75 0.75 37 Dec 92 Dec 02
15 3.05 3.33 3.36 4.36 -0.28 -0.31 -1.32 35 Jun 98 Apr 01
16 3.00 1.77 1.76 1.58 1.23 1.24 1.42 56 Mar 98 Dec 02
17 2.98 2.60 2.62 2.73 0.37 0.35 0.25 34 Mar 00 Dec 02
18 2.86 1.94 1.94 1.91 0.93 0.93 0.96 35 Jan 96 Nov 98
19 2.78 1.79 1.79 1.80 0.99 0.99 0.98 42 Dec 98 Dec 02
20 2.64 1.66 1.66 1.71 0.98 0.97 0.93 30 Mar 98 Aug 00
Mean reduction of alpha in percent [αOLS / (αOLS -αSURA)] 42% 41% 41%
This table reports the monthly Bayesian posterior alphas and the OLS alphas (from equation (1)) for the top 20 equity long/short funds. The second column
reports the OLS alpha estimate (αOLS). Columns three to five report the posterior alpha estimate (αSURA) from the seemingly unrelated assets approach of Pastor
and Stambaugh (2002) for different values of the prior of σαN. Columns six to eight report the differences between the OLS alpha and the posterior alpha.
Column nine reports the number of monthly observations for each fund and columns 10 and 11 report the start and end dates of the fund. The sample period is
from January 1990 to December 2002.
Table VI
Top 20 hedge fund alpha estimates using seemingly unrelated assets approach of Pastor and Stambaugh (2002)
bootstrap mean std max min adj alpha start end start end mean
fund alpha p value rsqr return dev return return /alpha date date fund status aum aum inflow
1 5.680 0.004 0.44 1.51 7.61 18.26 -11.50 0.018 Mar 00 Dec 02 SPPX [0.4] GSCI [-0.37] SP [0.75] live 22.2 64.3 0.035
2 4.700 0.000 0.56 4.20 4.27 17.38 -3.16 0.844 Jul 97 Oct 00 SP [-0.34] RUS3000 [0.6] PTFSSTK [0.03] stop rep 23.6 211.8 0.161
3 4.445 0.000 0.54 2.60 5.66 18.64 -7.45 0.426 Feb 95 Jan 01 SP [0.81] PTFSSTK [0.12] PTFSBD [-0.07] stop rep 21.6 354.0 0.101
4 4.319 0.000 0.70 1.12 6.70 17.30 -10.70 0.616 Jul 98 Dec 00 SP [3.18] PTFSBD [-0.08] HML [0.63] stop rep 23.0 82.0 0.318
5 4.295 0.010 0.49 2.23 8.86 39.82 -21.94 0.886 Mar 99 Dec 02 SPCX [4.39] BAA [0.63] SPPX [-3.53] live 23.3 127.1 0.030
6 4.182 0.000 0.91 1.92 6.59 16.54 -10.59 1.051 Jan 97 Oct 99 GSCI [0.7] PTFSCOM [-0.12] SML [0.56] terminated 38.3 80.5 0.045
7 3.798 0.000 0.92 0.48 11.52 42.60 -31.84 1.616 May 99 Dec 02 MEM [-0.06] HML [-0.8] MOM [0.09] live 21.6 21.7 0.014
8 3.748 0.000 0.64 1.46 8.54 19.60 -19.58 0.672 Jan 96 Dec 02 HML [-0.64] SPCX [4.66] SMB [0.49] live 47.3 23.0 -0.014
9 3.636 0.020 0.49 2.14 8.79 39.82 -22.15 0.913 Jan 99 Dec 02 SPCX [4.36] MOM [0.18] SPPX [-4.85] live 36.6 45.2 -0.017
10 3.596 0.000 0.60 1.21 9.75 49.55 -34.06 0.681 Jan 97 Dec 02 HML [-1.04] MEM [0.21] SBG [5.13] live 42.4 42.7 0.133
11 3.596 0.000 0.44 3.65 11.09 97.61 -23.55 0.424 May 98 Dec 02 SMB [-1.34] PTFSSIR [-0.24] na live 20.7 34.7 0.007
12 3.522 0.000 0.76 2.82 11.94 52.29 -50.30 0.510 May 98 Apr 01 RUS3000 [1.08] SBW [1.05] FRBI [-3.66] stop rep 35.1 23.0 0.014
13 3.180 0.000 0.62 0.90 10.02 49.55 -34.06 1.097 Mar 97 Dec 02 SPCX [4.78] HML [-1.02] SML [0.5] live 41.4 61.0 -0.014
14 3.110 0.009 0.86 0.37 9.00 43.41 -17.29 -0.509 Dec 92 Dec 02 HYMTSY [0.68] HML [-0.81] PTFSBD [0.18] live 20.4 167.5 0.014
15 3.050 0.000 0.53 2.72 4.47 11.50 -5.32 0.936 Jun 98 Apr 01 PTFSSTK [0.12] MOM [0.27] HML [0.26] stop rep 20.4 280.6 0.057
16 2.999 0.000 0.46 1.70 5.88 24.39 -12.72 0.633 Mar 98 Dec 02 PTFSSTK [0.14] FRBI [-0.67] MXUS [0.42] live 20.8 347.3 0.048
17 2.975 0.000 0.79 1.71 9.36 43.86 -21.53 0.680 Mar 00 Dec 02 SP [1.34] PTFSBD [-0.15] SBG [2.02] live 24.9 166.7 0.059
18 2.863 0.000 0.58 3.10 4.84 16.58 -5.30 0.362 Jan 96 Nov 98 MXUS [0.25] PTFSSTK [0.11] SPPX [-1.64] stop rep 113.0 360.0 0.105
19 2.781 0.000 0.83 2.21 10.96 23.33 -26.35 0.043 Dec 98 Dec 02 MEM [0.59] PTFSCOM[0.13] SPPX [-2.62] live 22.0 23.4 0.001
20 2.638 0.000 0.54 2.58 5.29 13.54 -8.32 0.625 Mar 98 Aug 00 HYMTSY [0.57] SML[0.31] PTFSSIR [0.07] terminated 20.7 102.4 0.114
top three factors [beta]
Table VII
Summary statistics of top 20 equity long short funds
Summary statistics are presented for the top twenty long short equity hedge funds. Adjusted alpha ('adj alpha') is the estimated alpha of a fund after removing the top three return
observations. Factors are the Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors chosen from a step wise regression. The Agarwal and Naik (2004) factors are Russell
3000 index (RUS3000), Fama and French size (SMB), book-to-market (HML) and momentum (MOM) factors, MSCI excluding US index (MXUS), MSCI emerging markets index
(MEM), Salomon bond index (SBG), Salomon world government index (SBW), Lehman high yield bond index (LHY), Fed trade weighted dollar index (FRBI), Goldman Sachs
commodity index (GSCI), Moody's BAA rated corporate bond index (BAA), OTM call option index (SPCX), and OTM put option index (SPPX). The Fung and Hsieh (2001)
factors are S&P 500 return (SP), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SML), change in the constant maturity yield of the 10 year treasury (TSY), change in the spread of
Moody's Baa - 10 year treasury (HYMTSY) bond PTFS (PTFSBD), commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), short term interest rate straddle PTFS
(PTFSSIR),  and stock PTFS (PTFSSTK).   PTFS is primitive trend following strategy.   Fund inflow is net dollar flow scaled by last month's assets under management after adjustin
Aum is assets under management in USD (millions). The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2002.
Portfolio Equal-weighted Value-weighted Closed funds Open funds Small funds Large funds
Post-fee alpha spread 0.225** 0.118 0.363** 0.139 0.207** 0.173
(3.49) (0.70) (5.09) (1.73) (2.83) (1.86)
Pre-fee alpha spread 0.397** 0.261 0.537** 0.323** 0.417** 0.365**
(5.88) (1.49) (6.38) (4.05) (5.04) (4.33)
Table VIII
Persistence of Fund Alpha
Hedge funds are sorted each month from January 1993 to December 1999 into decile portfolios based on their alphas estimated over the prior 3 years. We require a
minimum of 30 monthly return observations for this estimate. The mean alpha of the funds in each decile is calculated using the next three years of data. The spread is the
difference in mean alpha between the funds in decile 1 (highest alpha) and decile 10 (lowest alpha). The factors used to estimate alpha are the Agarwal and Naik (2004)
and Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors chosen from a step-wise regression. Closed funds are funds whose average inflows fall below the median average inflow over the
evaluation period. Open funds are funds whose average inflows lie above the median average inflow over the evaluation period. Small funds are funds whose assets under
management (aum) fall below the median aum at the start of the evaluation period. Large funds are funds whose aum lie above the median aum at the start of the evaluation
period. All portfolios are equal-weighted unless stated otherwise. The t -statistics, derived from Newey and West (1987) standard errors, are in parentheses. * Significant at
the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
